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1. A talented experimentalist and theoretician, trained in physics no less than in 
psychology, Wolfgang Köhler famously provided outstanding advancements in the 
development of the theory of Gestalt . In some of his works, Köhler interestingly 1
developed philosophical ideas as well. To be sure, he never considered himself a 
professional philosopher. Rather, as a consequence of his permanent commitment to 
scientific investigation and scientific methods, Köhler was eager to reflect upon the 
consequences of applying a scientific world view to human life. In his own words, he 
discussed the question of The place of value in a world of facts, as the title of his 1938 
book reads. 
In this essay I investigate some of Köhler’s philosophical ideas. Köhler 
competently discusses the problem of facts and values, which is still urgent nowadays. 
To this purpose, he expresses his views concerning the nature of phenomenological 
data, the way mental and brain processes are related and the structure of physical 
reality. Although his philosophical reflexions mainly ensue from his epistemological 
turn, consisting in the adoption of the Gestalt's point of view in psychology, in The 
Place of Value in a World of Facts and in other works Köhler goes far beyond Gestalt 
psychology and develops a consistent and partly autonomous epistemology. In his 
view, true science cannot allow for the contradiction arising between the complete 
absence of value-related entities in the physical world and the obvious value-
relatedness of many, or most, human behaviors. Positivism and behaviorism tried to 
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overcome this gap, arguing for the actual absence of values within both the scientific 
and human world: human beings, as outcomes of evolution, can be wholly explained 
as the mere result of ordinary physical laws. Yet, positivists manifestly contradict 
themselves insofar as they consider factual science as their supreme value. As a 
reaction to this point of view, Köhler notes, spiritualism argue for the existence of a 
spiritual principle, and vitalism claims that the laws governing the world of living beings 
cannot ever be reduced to those of inorganic nature. 
Köhler is unsatisfied with all of these views. His arguments have nothing to do 
with a plea for the intrinsic value of humanity according to spiritualistic, vitalistic (or 
extra-scientific, e.g. religious) stances. Rather, Köhler insists on the logical 
inconsistency of spiritualistic attempts and seeks for a different solution within the 
framework of what he calls “epistemological dualism”. As we shall see, Köhler aims at 
a new interpretation of physical facts and laws that should include (or, at least, should 
not clash with) the principle of “requiredness” as a basis for a value theory. Köhler is 
consciously far from developing a wholly detailed theory of value. Nevertheless, the 
strategy underlying his arguments is quite clear and offers an interesting contribution, 
enabling epistemology to bridge the increasing gap between natural and human 
sciences. 
My analysis of this theme is organized as follows: in the first place, I present 
Köhler’s intellectual path towards the definition of his philosophical ideas and draw 
special attention to his concept of “physical Gestalt” (2). Secondly, I illustrate his 
philosophy of science and his thought in the field of phenomenology, compared to Carl 
Stumpf’s ideas on those matters (3). Finally, I discuss Köhler’s solution to the problem 
of value within the general framework of his “epistemological dualism”(4). 
2. Born in Estonia in 1887 from German parents, Köhler soon moved to 
Germany. He studied in Tübingen, Bonn and Berlin, where he received his Ph.D. under 
Carl Stumpf’s direction in 1909, with a thesis concerning psychological acoustics . 2
Köhler then moved to Frankfurt, where he cooperated with Wertheimer and Koffka to 
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the seminal experiences that laid the foundations of the Gestalt theory. In 1913, 
following Stumpf’s suggestion, Köhler went to Tenerife, where he directed the 
anthropoid research station of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Due to the war, 
Köhler was forced to stay there longer than he had expected or wanted to. His 
experimental results concerning intelligent behavior in apes were published in 
Intelligenzprüfungen an Antrhopoiden, an essay that started a new way of considering 
animal intelligence . During his years in Tenerife, Köhler also began his researches in 3
physics and conceived a project, whose results were published in 1920 in the volume 
Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand. In the early Twenties 
Köhler assumed the direction of the Institut für Psychologie and succeeded Stumpf in 
the position of professor of philosophy and psychology in Berlin . Köhler successfully 4
brought about the Gestaltists’ point of view both from a theoretical and from an 
experimental point of view. In 1935, Köhler was invited to Harvard to deliver the William 
James lectures, later published as The place of value in a world of facts . Back to 5
Germany, Köhler publicly pronounced himself against the persecution of Jews by the 
Nazis: that would be the last public protest in the Third Reich . Thanks to his 6
international fame, Köhler was not arrested, yet he had to leave his post and move to 
the United States. He joined the Swarthmore College and later the Dartmouth College 
in New Hampshire, where he died in 1967.
An interesting chapter in Köhler’s career is represented by his relationship with 
Stumpf. Stumpf, who had studied under Franz Brentano and had later deeply modified 
his teacher’s views, had devoted himself both to philosophy and to experimental 
research, contributing to overcome associationism and positivism in psychology and 
developing some historical antecedent (e.g. “tonal fusion”) of the concept of Gestalt. 
Moreover, Stumpf recommended a sound scientific training to all those who were 
interested in philosophical issues, and advocated cooperation between natural 
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sciences and philosophy . As we shall see, Köhler shared Stumpf's attitude towards 7
science. In the following paragraphs I also underline some similarities between 
Stumpf’s and Köhler’s phenomenological description of the basic facts of 
consciousness. Still, the remarkable differences between Stumpf's and Köhler's views 
are to be considered as well. Stumpf never adhered to the Gestalt theory, which 
seemed simply untenable to him . In turn, in 1913 Köhler sharply criticized a crucial 8
issue of Stumpf's psychological theory, namely, the so-called “unnoticed sensations” 
and the related hypothesis of constancy between stimulus and sensation . But then, 9
Stumpf was a relatively liberal teacher, who never aimed at establishing a “school” and 
sincerely appreciated his students’ originality . Despite Köhler’s criticism – and, on the 10
other side, his own skepticism towards the Gestalt theory – Stumpf held Köhler in high 
esteem and actively supported his academic career. 
In the above mentioned book, Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im 
stationären Zustand, Köhler aims at revealing organized, Gestalt-like structures within 
the physical universe. Hans Driesch and other advocates of vitalism had already 
allowed for Gestalt-like processes within organic nature . But Köhler believes that the 11
concept of Gestalt, originally born from the new psychology, can gain full scientific 
citizenship also in physics. In his attempt, Köhler mainly relies upon James Clerk 
Maxwell’s field theory. Indeed, forces or electric charges within an electromagnetic field 
show properties that exceed the mere sum of the involved items. As Köhler puts it, they 
tend to assume time-independent states, with a minimum energy dissipation and 
maximum entropy. The opponents of Gestalt psychology, who assume that any 
complex phenomena result from elementary elements and association processes, are 
thus mistaken when they claim they comply to the methods of physics. Against them, 
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Köhler claims that, for instance, the distribution of electric charges in a certain physical 
body is a “physical Gestalt”. 
Still, he does not think of the whole physical world as made up of Gestalts. Some 
facts are obviously the result of a mere combination of forces or processes. Köhler 
draws particular attention to a special field of the physical world, i.e. the central 
nervous system. Provided that Gestalts exist within the physical world, then nothing 
prevents us from believing that the central nervous system also assumes Gestalt-like 
states . Even  more so, since what happens in the brain essentially consists of electric 12
processes. According to Köhler, neural processes and states should not be considered 
aggregates of isolated units, acting separately and independently of each other. 
Rather, the central nervous system typically assumes Gestalt-like states . To support 13
this view, since 1920 Köhler introduces a complex interpretation of neural processes in 
terms of Walther Nernst’s theory of galvanic chains. Studying the retinal processes, 
Georg Elias Müller had already proposed a psychophysical interpretation of Nernst’s 
chains; yet Köhler expands this construct to the whole central nervous system. 
Accordingly, he hypothesizes that the physiological process underlying a certain spatial 
perception is a physical Gestalt, whose spatial properties roughly correspond to the 
perceived Gestalt .14
In 1920, Köhler lays the theoretical groundwork for his famous postulate of 
(psycho-physical) isomorphism. As Köhler would later formulate, “psychological facts 
and the brain events that underlie them are similar in all their structural 
characteristics” . Isomorphism has been often criticized by psychologists and 15
physiologists for its lack of empirical evidence. Köhler always replied to his critics that 
isomorphism was a working hypothesis, allowing us to explain a certain set of facts 
concerning perception. Be that as it may, these theses also brought about a debate as 
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to his general philosophical views . Since the perceived Gestalts correspond to the 16
physical world, Köhler seems to adhere to realism. Yet some scholars consider him an 
idealist, because he claims for no more than a correspondence between 
neurophysiological states and phenomenal percepts, not material things. I shall discuss 
this question in the final chapter of this essay. In my view, Köhler's “epistemological 
dualism” implies neither realism nor idealism: rather, it supports a monistic world view, 
being an attempt to adhere to facts both in psychology and in physics, matching the 
immediacy of phenomenology with a robust scientific world view. 
3. We can now turn to Köhler’s discussion of the problem of value, as illustrated 
in The place of value in a world of facts. The purpose of the book, stated in the 
Preface, is “philosophical”. In recent times, Köhler notes, doubts have been raised as 
to whether science is able to contribute to the “fundamental issues of mankind”. Is it 
acceptable that science and philosophy proceed separately? Köhler suggests that they 
should rather follow a common path. More explicitly, philosophy should learn from 
science and proceed step by step instead of proposing ready-made solutions for the 
ultimate questions. Philosophers should learn “patience”, that is, a true scientific 
attitude consisting in the awareness of the limits to one’s achievements. Philosophers 
no less than scientists always leave unsolved problems to other researchers. Köhler 
was probably influenced by Stumpf, whose ideas concerning the philosophers' 
compliance with the methods of science are quite the same .17
In the first, introductory chapter (“The case against science”) Köhler stages a 
dialogue between a skeptical editor of a magazine’s special issue about the Krise der 
Wissenschaft (“crisis of science”) and himself. Unsurprisingly, in the dialogue Köhler 
 For the realistic interpretation see Ash 1995, 177 ff. esp. 186. By contrast, Keiler 1980 16
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 Stumpf 1939-40, I, 123: “Philosophy should get rid of the habit of appearing on the 17
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leaves open many more questions than those it provides answers for”. 
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plays the role of the champion of science . Nevertheless, the opponent’s arguments 18
are consistent. Sciences altogether (the German term Wissenschaft refers to human 
learning in general) seem indeed unable to contribute to human purposes. Scientists, 
when they are questioned about the fundamental issues of mankind, usually shy away 
and prefer to concentrate upon the details of their narrow-minded research. According 
to the triumphant positivistic stances, science has nothing to do with human values and 
is avowedly unable to explain them. A human being – positivists say – is nothing but 
the result of evolution, nothing but 70% water and 30% cheap rough chemical 
elements, and so on . In this reductionistic way, however, positivists lose sight of their 19
objectives. Structural properties, Köhler suggests, supervene the constitutive elements 
and require a more accurate explanation than the mantra-like recurring refrain nothing-
but-something. 
As any other individual who firmly believes in science, Köhler aims at defending it 
against the above mentioned charges. The main question to be faced is the following: 
are there only “mere facts or, besides mere facts, right and wrong”? Köhler explains: 
Let us for the moment give the name value to this common trait of intrinsic 
requiredness or wrongness, and let us call insight all awareness of such intellectual, 
moral or aesthetic value. We can then say that value and corresponding insight 
constitute the very essence of human mental life. Take any major human problem, and 
you will find that it contains this factor . 20
In the course of his analysis, Köhler privileges the rather technical term 
“requiredness” over “value”. As far as the readability of his book is concerned, this 
choice is questionable; however, Köhler correctly remarks that “requiredness” applies 
both to logical necessity and to values in the narrower, i.e. ethical and aesthetic 
 The Berlin Gestaltists’ compliance to scientific methods, and their adherence to science 18
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sense . The main question then becomes: what is the origin of requiredness, as 21
opposed to mere factuality? 
Traditional philosophical solutions are inadequate. Plato famously situated values 
beyond any experience; Kant agreed with him about the transcendence of values, yet 
included it in the a priori mechanisms of the human mind. Thereafter, pace Kant, 
naturalism and reductionism took the lead and denied any special meaning to human 
values. As a reaction, Köhler notes, vitalists attempted to defend organic nature from 
such naturalistic pretensions, while “Humanists and some philosophers of culture” 
retreated “still farther back into the realm of the mind and its achievements” . In this 22
context, Edmund Husserl’s great merit was to understand that even logic was in 
danger, since positivists argued that also logical laws were nothing but laws of “real 
thinking”, and truth (or logical necessity) nothing but a matter of psychological 
mechanisms. Köhler clearly sympathizes for Husserl’s phenomenological method. But 
he complains that Husserl eventually escaped into the realm of pure logical essence, 
and – no less than Plato and Kant – left the general question of requiredness 
unanswered .23
Köhler takes into account recent theories of value, as well. He especially dwells 
upon the General Theory of Value by Ralph Barton Perry, who defends a subjective 
theory, according to which values ensue from human interest . Accordingly, as soon as 24
something becomes the object of someone’s interest, that thing acquires value. By 
contrast, Köhler insists on an objective theory of value. Things do not gain value 
because someone is interested in them - rather, human beings get interested in certain 
things because they are valuable. But how to defend this point of view, if the world is 
made up of mere facts? 
 Köhler 1938, 37. See De Monticelli 2013. 21
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As a first step, in the subsequent Chapter (“An Analysis of Requiredness”) Köhler 
goes back to phenomenology. Yet he deeply modifies Husserl’s understanding of it . In 25
fact, in Köhler’s view, phenomenology should not be confined to logic and timeless 
entities. Phenomenology entails the description of any immediate experience as such, 
regardless of otherwise acquired knowledge concerning the origin (or the organic 
basis) of the involved percepts. This task, Köhler admits, is always at risk of 
misunderstanding, because of a typical ambivalence of some of the crucial terms of 
phenomenology, that have also an objective meaning. In Köhler’s words: 
Phenomenally, the bodily ‘self’ is not a physical entity outside immediate 
experience as is the physical organism; it is, rather, a percept of which we are aware, 
enriched by changing moods, attitudes, efforts and activities. Similarly, ‘objects’ in this 
discipline are phenomenal things, for instance percepts. (Images, concepts, and the 
like, are also called ‘objects’ and not without justification.) Percepts are, of course, not 
ghosts belonging somehow to the phenomenal 'self.' Those, at least, which we call 
‘things’ look, in general, most ‘real’, ‘independent’, ‘permanent’ and ‘substantial’; they 
often feel ‘heavy’ and as a rule ‘resistant’. All this implies in no sense a contradiction of 
their nature as phenomenal things. Their place is not in the ‘self’ – why should these 
percepts be localized inside another particular percept?–, but in other parts of 
phenomenal ‘space’, near or far as the case may be. In this world which is that of naive 
everyday life, certain parts, events and properties belong phenomenally to the ‘self’ 
others belong to ‘objects’ or, more generally speaking, to the phenomenal environment 
of the ‘self’. The former have the character of ‘subjectivity’ which, in this sense, is only 
another name for the fact that they appear and are counted as parts or states of the 
‘self’; the latter have, in most cases, the character of ‘objectivity’.'26
Köhler clearly distinguishes two aspects within phenomenal experience: 
subjectivity and objectivity. Phenomenal data have a subjective aspect (the ‘self’) and 
an objective aspect (‘things’). Probably, Köhler goes on, the subdivision in a subjective 
and an objective area within human consciousness is progressively acquired, or 
learned in the course of individual development. At the same time, and without any 
contradiction, both subjective and objective phenomenal data are “genetically 
subjective”, that is, they belong to the experience of a certain human subject and, as 
such, depend on the individual's central nervous system. Thus, Köhler makes a point of 
 Köhler 1938, 68. Köhler rejects the tendency of some other phenomenologists towards 25
mysticism and obscure philosophizing (possibly an allusion to Martin Heidegger). 
 Köhler 1938, 68. 26
carefully avoiding any confusion between the phenomenal ‘self’ and the organic body. 
The former is part of experience, the latter never appears within it.
Before discussing this theory in the next chapter, let us make a historical 
digression concerning, once more, Stumpf’s influence. For Stumpf as well, there is no 
“pure” phenomenological investigation. Rather, phenomenology should focus on 
“regional” research concerning ordinary experience, and especially perceptual issues . 27
In a 1906 essay, Stumpf distinguished between appearances (Erscheinungen) and 
psychic functions (psychische Funktionen). “Appearances” are the basic sense-data 
(both actually sensed or remembered), and the relations among them; “psychic 
functions” are all mental activities and states: e.g. perceiving, judging, feeling emotions, 
desiring, etc . Thus, in Stumpf’s view, phenomenal experience has an ultimately 28
dualistic aspect, that cannot be overcome in any way . As we shall see, Köhler adopts 29
a dualist epistemology too. Furthermore, Stumpf anticipates another of Köhler’s tenets 
when he claims that recognizing objective presentations as the effect of external 
objects has to do with “the distinction of the body from its environment”, slowly 
developing within conscience during one’s growth . Objective and subjective data are 30
thus embedded in basic phenomenology; their distinction is the result of individual 
evolution. Nevertheless, despite these similarities, one should bear in mind that Stumpf 
reserved the word ‘phenomenology’ for a more limited task than Köhler did. For 
Stumpf, phenomenology is a preliminary science devoted to the analysis of objective 
sense-data. By contrast, Köhler integrates the analysis of subjective sense-data (i.e. 
what Stumpf would rather call “eidology”) into phenomenology. 
4. Relying upon his phenomenological analysis, Köhler faces the main question 
concerning facts and values in an innovative way. Values, he claims, are objective. This 
means that there is a certain “vector”, whose origin lies in a certain object, in the 
phenomenal field. This terminology, typical for instance of many of Kurt Lewin’s works, 
 Stumpf 1939-40. See Fisette 2015.  27
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clearly resembles the field theory in physics. In fact, vectors represent forces defined in 
a certain field, which is, in this case, the phenomenal field. To explain that, Köhler first 
reminds his reader of the general postulates of the Gestalt theory: 
In Gestalt psychology we distinguish three major traits which are conspicuous in 
all cases of specific organization or gestalt. Phenomenally the world is neither an 
indifferent mosaic nor an indifferent continuum. It exhibits definite segregated units or 
contexts in all degrees of complexity, articulation and clearness. Secondly such units 
show properties belonging to them as contexts or systems. Again the parts of such 
units or contexts exhibit dependent properties in the sense that, given the place of a 
part in the context, its dependent properties are determined by this position .31
In order to exemplify the situation, Köhler goes on, let us suppose that a melody 
in a certain key, e.g. of a-minor, is played on a piano. The resulting chord of this 
melody, in most cases, will be an a-minor chord. In this case, the a-minor chord is 
perceived as the “right” chord, while any other chord would break in as a “wrong” one. 
The requiredness of the a-minor chord, Köhler concludes, is completely objective. It 
does not depend on a subjective preference. Obviously enough, the melody and the 
chord are made up of single tones. But the “tertiary quality” represented by its key of a-
minor dissolves if those tones are presented separately . Therefore, Köhler notes:32
[w]e can analyze the melody, but not in independent parts. That would be 
destruction of the melody. Its minor-character for instance would be lost. We can 
analyze the situation of subjective requiredness, but […] not in independent parts, all 
taken by themselves. The vector – and requiredness – cannot exist alone any more 
than a fish can live out of water .33
In some cases, the vector originates from another human subject. For instance, 
the police officer who makes me stop at the crossing, a beggar who holds out his hand 
towards me. This fact, Köhler believes, does not make any significant exception to the 
objective explanation of requiredness. Rather, one should distinguish two cases: “in the 
 Köhler 1938, 84-85.  31
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first, the vector points toward the object, in the other the object is the point of origin of 
the vector” . 34
So far, requiredness has been explained from a phenomenological point of view. 
Yet, Köhler is far from reaching his final goal. Phenomenology is “the field in which all 
concepts” – including requiredness – “find their final justification”. But then those 
concepts can and must be applied to extra-phenomenal fields, too . Consequently, 35
Köhler needs to extend the analysis of requiredness “beyond phenomenology”, as the 
title of the next chapter reads. For the sake of the present concern, I shall distinguish 
three main steps within Köhler’s way beyond phenomenology: (1) the experience of 
transcendence, (2) the pseudoproblem of realism, and (3) the postulate of 
isomorphism.  
(1) Firstly, Köhler reflects upon the possibility of experiencing transcendence. 
With this, he does not think of a mystic or religious experience of “transcendent” divine 
entities. Rather, he draws attention to some liminal case, in which conscious 
experience seems to require, or imply, an extra-phenomenal world which transcends 
consciousness itself. In this fascinating analysis, Köhler always takes for granted that 
there is something beyond phenomenology: a physiological support for consciousness, 
consisting in the central nervous system. This system never manifests itself 
phenomenally. We know about it only indirectly, that is, via a series of scientific 
inferences concerning the biological basis of life and consciousness. Nevertheless, 
Köhler argues, some experiences let us guess its presence. Since experience does not 
consist of atomic facts, but rather of oriented vectors, nothing prevents us from thinking 
of a vector pointing from inside experience outwards, or vice versa. As an example, 
Köhler refers to memory.  It is commonly experienced that sometimes we repeatedly 36
fail to recall a certain name although, at the same time, we feel close to remembering 
it. In Köhler’s words: 
 Köhler 1938, 93-94. 34
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I wish to remember the new painter’s name which I heard yesterday during a 
conversation. “Just a moment,” I say to myself, “I know that I know it; I shall get it at 
once.” Everybody has such experiences. Before a name or another fact is actually 
remembered there may be a difficulty, a suspense, a delay in its appearance. 
Nevertheless we may know at the same time that “it is there”; we feel referred, and 
even referred to the right thing, even though this same thing has not yet emerged into 
phenomenal existence.37
Significantly, here Köhler pays a tribute to William James, who discussed this 
experience in his Principles of Psychology.  As James put it, in this case there is an 38
“intesively active” gap in our consciousness. “If wrong names are proposed to us, this 
singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its 
mould” . According to Köhler’s explanation, the painter’s name actually lies outside 39
consciousness and, from “there”, directs consciousness towards the right solution. 
When we are presented with wrong names, we are so to speak told “from outside” that 
the correct solution is still to come. In this case, Köhler believes, one actually 
experiences transcendence. Within phenomenology, consciousness feels its own 
incompleteness and claims for completion: the complement, however, clearly resides 
outside consciousness.  
The distinctive trait of transcendence as we observed it, was direct coherence of 
function, of reference, between an incomplete phenomenal context and a 
transphenomenal entity. There is only one part of nature which, according to present 
knowledge, could in this case be so intimately in contact with phenomenal data. This 
part of nature is the circumscribed world of brain-events. Our conclusion will therefore 
be that, in trying to remember something and knowing that we know it, our reference is 
from the point of view of science reference to a definite neurological, or better: neural 
entity, an entity which would commonly and perhaps clumsily be called a memory-
trace.40
  
(2) Secondly, Köhler discusses another form of transcendence - namely, the 
external world beyond our central nervous system. Whereas the formerly discussed 
argument contrasts with phenomenalism, Köhler now challenges realism. Against both 
 Köhler 1938, 117. 37
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doctrines, Köhler defends the point of view of “epistemological dualism”.  Accordingly, 
phenomenal objects do not coincide with the things of the world; however, 
phenomenology is not the whole story, because consciousness depends on brain 
processes. Before discussing this position more extensively, let us consider Köhler’s 
opposition to the so-called New Realism, a school of thought represented among 
others by R. Barton Parry. New Realists assume that, for any unsophisticated person, 
there is only one world, which is “the physical world no less than it is the world 
perceived”. However, Köhler is far from advocating an idealistic world view as an 
alternative to realism. Rather, he thinks that compliance to realism results from a wrong 
conceptual setting: the new realists rely upon “a most unfortunate pseudoproblem 
produced by inconsistent thinking”.  As previously seen, Köhler distinguishes a 41
subjective side (the ‘self’) and an objective one (phenomenal objects) within 
phenomenology. Within this framework, the experience of my own body stands as an 
object among others. For instance, I see a sheet of paper and a pen on my desk, but 
also my hands and a part of my two arms. 
According to Köhler, the parts of our body belong to the objective part of 
phenomenal experience, no less than any other inanimate object around us. Now, the 
above mentioned pseudoproblem originates from a systematic lack of distinction 
between phenomenal and “transphenomenal” objects. Whenever we say that “percepts 
depend on processes inside the organism”, the organism is a “physical object”, whose 
properties are investigated, for instance, by an anatomist. This object, as such, never 
recurs within the individual’s immediate experience. By contrast, whenever we say that 
“thing-percepts are located outside myself”, the word “myself” refers to something “of 
which I am aware in the bright daylight of direct phenomenal experience”.  42
Accordingly, “when thing-percepts and other phenomena are said to be genetically 
subjective, to depend upon processes inside the organism, the term ‘inside’ refers to a 
physical, a transphenomenal fact”; by contrast, “when thing-percepts are said to be 
located ‘outside myself’ the term ‘outside’ must refer to a strictly phenomenal fact: In 
 Köhler 1938, 127. See also 1929, 224-233 (an analysis that Köhler later considered 41
unsatisfactory) and 1929.   
 Köhler 1938, 129. 42
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phenomenal space thing-percepts are as a rule localized ‘outside’ one more percept 
which I call ‘my body’.” The inconsistency, Köhler claims, lies in a different meaning of 
the words: inside means inside my organic body, which never becomes phenomenally 
evident; by contrast, outside means outside that particular phenomenal object that is 
my own perceived body.  43
(3) Finally, Köhler discusses the principle of psycho-physical isomorphism, 
introduced above. According to this principle, there should be a certain structural 
homology between the perceived objects and the corresponding physiological brain 
process. Therefore, Köhler argues, there is a certain homology between the brain 
process by which, for example, the desk and the book are perceived as outside my 
hands and my arms, and the corresponding percepts. Similarly, a house, a cloud and a 
tree are separate things within the phenomenal space. Köhler devotes the entire 
subsequent chapter to the discussion of isomorphism, partly relying upon his previous 
researches on the physical Gestalts . Isomorphism, in short, strengthens the thesis 44
that phenomenal experience shows a dichotomy: on the one side, my own body, on the 
other, all the things surrounding it. Further chapters are devoted to the discussion of 
the scientific world view, and of mechanism and vitalism in biology . For the present 45
discussion, however, it suffices to point out that Köhler tries to give a scientific basis to 
his philosophical theory of epistemological dualism. 
On the basis of the three above listed arguments, Köhler concludes by endorsing 
epistemological dualism, which he defines as follows:   
Epistemological Dualism holds that percepts cannot be identified with physical 
objects, because percepts emerge only after many events have happened between the 
objects and the organism, in peripheral parts of the organism and eventually in the 
brain. This view seems to lead to a paradox since, as a rule, thing-percepts appear 
outside our body. We have first shown that this argument is due to an ambiguity of 
terms. Then, in a discussion of neurological data, we have found that on this ground 
localization of thing-percepts ‘inside ourselves’ could never be expected. Much 
discussion between the New Realists and their opponents would probably have been 
 Köhler 1938, 130. 43
 “On Isomorphism”: Köhler 1938, 185-232. 44
 “On Memory and on Transcendence”, “A Discussion of Organic Fitness”: Köhler 1938, 45
233-278; 279-328. 
avoided if more attention had been given to these sections of psychology and 
neurology.46
In accordance with this evidence, the question as to whether Köhler should be 
considered a realist or an idealist in philosophy can be reconsidered. In fact, Köhler 
was neither realist nor idealist. He opposed naive realism, claiming that human 
perception has no direct grasp of worldly things. Yet he escaped the cage of idealism 
and firmly believed that a world of things does exist, and that consciousness as a 
whole depends on one of these things, i.e., the nervous system. One should bear in 
mind that Köhler did not conceive dualism in an ontological form. He considered the 
unescapable two-sidedness of phenomenological experience as the first word of 
philosophy, not its last . Rather, in Köhler’s view, epistemological dualism is the only 47
reliable basis for ontological monism, that is, for the claim that there is no substantial 
difference between the human and the natural world. Both these worlds have their 
roots in the same physical laws, but these laws involve also instances of requiredness 
in the earlier mentioned sense. Köhler’s analysis of the apparent dichotomy between 
facts and values testifies of this unifying attitude.
On the basis of epistemological dualism, in fact, Köhler is eventually able to solve 
the problem of value. Relatedness has no subjective origin – or, at least, not 
necessarily. Vectors can originate both within the objective and within the subjective 
side of our phenomenal experience; moreover, they can originate outside experience 
(in what he calls the “transphenomenal” field) and terminate within it. In sum, 
requiredness has four main characteristics: 
First: A datum, an entity or an act is required within a context of other data, 
entities or acts. [...]
Secondly: Within the context in question requiredness is a dependent 
characteristic that has no existence of its own, apart from the entities that fit or do not 
fit each other in these contexts.
Thirdly: All requiredness transcends from certain parts of a context to others of 
the same context. Like all other kinds of reference, it is in this sense a directed 
 Köhler 1938, 141. 46
 As we have seen, in this revival of epistemological dualism Köhler probably relied upon 47
Stumpf. Yet Stumpf claimed that the existence of the external world is a hypothetical construct.  
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translocal trait, a vector, that cannot be split into bits which have a merely local 
existence. […]
Fourthly: Requiredness differs strikingly from other forms of reference by its 
demanding character. It involves acceptance or rejection of the present status of the 
context in question, often more particularly, acceptance or rejection of some part by the 
remainder of the context. This demanding character has degrees of intensity. The lower 
this intensity, the more will a condition of merely factual relation, juxtaposition or 
sequence be realized.48
Köhler points out the formal similarity between these four characteristics and the 
defining characters of a physical force. Forces are also defined within contexts (fields), 
they do not exist apart from it, they transcend from a part to another part of the given 
context, and they also contribute to establish a certain context, or resist to it, with 
different degrees of intensity.  Therefore, there are no grounds for a gap between a 49
physical world of mere facts and a human world of values and necessities 
(requiredness).   
In the final chapter of The Place of Value in a World of Facts, devoted to the 
relationship between “Man and Nature”, Köhler tries to minimize the alleged gap 
between the world of physics and the world of human values. He agrees that human 
beings are the result of natural evolution, and that just ordinary natural forces have 
acted upon their development . However, Köhler notes, a necessary consequence of 50
this is the essential similarity between man and nature. The physicists’ suspiciousness 
of any kind of Aristotelian anthropomorphism is historically legitimate . But there is no 51
justification for an outright dismissal of any attempt of explanation in the field of human 
values as unscientific. In Köhler’s opinion, the price to be payed for this extraordinary 
extension of the scientific world view is quite modest: a slight revision of some 
concepts of physics or, more precisely: a perhaps unusual but entirely consistent way 
of looking at them. 
 Köhler 1938, 336-337. 48
 Köhler 1938, 342. 49
 See also Köhler 1950. 50
 Köhler 1938, 373. 51
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